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This article examines the role of opinion polls in East European countries, and assesses the impact that they 
have had on the general processes of political democratisation there since the collapse of communism.  
Certainly, opinion polls have taken a high-profile role in political affairs in these countries over the course 
of the last decade.  Policy-makers, politicians and political parties made much use of polls in the early years 
of democratic transition, although for various reasons they were received with significant scepticism by 
each of these users and by citizens alike.  This article compares recent research with earlier studies on the 
use of polls by political elites in countries seeking to consolidate democracy.  From recent in-depth 
interviews conducted with national politicians in Bulgaria, I draw upon a number of examples to examine 
the ways in which political parties and elites use opinion polls, and their intentions for doing so. 
 
 
When George Gallup first pioneered the use of opinion polling in the USA, he did so with the 
intention that it would serve to enhance and extend democratic processes and practices by 
providing a channel through which citizens could participate in political affairs.1 He advocated a 
‘populist’ notion of government, in which voters would have a significant input into decision-
making.  He claimed that opinion polls could provide a useful means through which this might be 
achieved, by objectively measuring the views of voters, and then communicating these to elected 
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representatives.  Ultimately, polls would help to increase the efficiency of representative 
government, by making elites more responsive to public opinion, and by facilitating greater 
popular participation in the political process.2  An opposing view can be constructed using 
Schumpeter’s ‘competitive elitism’ model.3  This would suggest that opinion polls are used by 
political elites to centralise, not decentralise political power.  In this way, polls would be 
commissioned by a political party with the express intention of acquiring information to gain 
competitive advantage over its political rivals. 
 
This article explores these issues by investigating the role of opinion polling in East European 
countries, and assessing the impact that polls have had on the general processes of political 
democratisation over the course of the last decade, following the collapse of communism.  
Specifically, it examines how political opinion polls are used by political parties and elected 
representatives, and how they are perceived by these agents and by citizens generally.  The article 
builds upon previous research,4 and examines whether there are today any parallels with these 
early experiences of the use of polls by elected representatives in countries seeking to consolidate 
democracy.  The findings are based upon a series of elite interviews with pollsters and with users 
of the polls (leading politicians from a variety of political parties) conducted in Bulgaria, 
December 1998.  The purpose of the qualitative interviews is to develop insights into the way that 
polls impact upon the political process in postcommunist societies.5 
 
Public Opinion, Opinion Polls and Political Democratisation 
According to some observers, polls in liberal-capitalist societies do more than provide citizens 
with knowledge about the political system, about political issues, and about the performance of 
political leaders.  They also enhance the opportunities for citizen influence, and ensure policy-
makers are sensitive and responsive to the demands of the public.6  Others have argued that ‘public 
opinion polling thrives in a democratic environment… that it is the handmaiden of modern 
democracy’7 where populations are dependent on governmental provision of public services, and 
where formalised procedures for monitoring public expression and popular feeling are ordinarily 
restricted to infrequent elections.  Underlying this view of the role of opinion polling is an implicit 
assumption that the nature of political power in liberal-capitalist societies is essentially pluralistic, 
with significant scope for popular intervention in decision-making.8  It suggests that the political 
system in these societies is sufficiently flexible to enable opinion polls to operate as links between 
the electorate and political representatives, and as mechanisms through which citizens can play a 
meaningful role in political affairs.  In this scenario, polls help to strengthen the general processes 
of political democratisation.   
  3 
 
An alternative view maintains that in liberal-capitalist societies, the political systems are largely 
closed to the public, with political power monopolised by small elite groups.9  For instance, 
Schumpeter’s model of ‘competitive elitism’ defines democracy as: ‘an institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which the individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.10  Using this characterisation of democracy, the 
chief concern of those who commission opinion polls is not that they should be used to devolve 
power to voters, but that they should be used to help gain further political power and influence for 
themselves.  Thus, polls are conducted not to empower wider society, but to sustain the political 
hegemony of elites.11   
 
Polls and Democracy in Liberal-Capitalist Societies 
Undoubtedly, opinion polling plays a significant role within the political process of most liberal-
capitalist societies, where it is used by governments, parties and the mass media alike.12  However, 
the extent to which polls complement and improve democratic practice in countries like Britain is 
unclear.  Their role is at best double-edged.  On one hand, the political landscape is such that 
political elites need to be responsive to public opinion in order to retain political power.  If they 
systematically ignore voter concerns then they may be punished at subsequent elections.  Political 
elites may use opinion polls as part of the process through which they establish direct contact with 
voters to nullify this risk.  Polls provide political elites with the intelligence information to: 
determine when and how to respond to the prevailing mood of the electorate; consider the views 
and likely responses of voters when designing, marketing, implementing, and modifying party 
policies; gain feedback about the public’s reactions to these policies, to issues and to events.13  In 
this way, polls fulfil a key function in terms of establishing political linkages between political 
elites and voters, and in so doing, provide a channel through which the public are able to make 
some indirect input into the affairs of government.   
 
However, this does not include the control of political elites.  Polls do not challenge the dominance 
and power of political elites.  Instead, they provide information with which these elites might 
devise strategies to successfully compete with rivals to secure political power.  In Britain for 
instance, political parties commission polls to win elections to government office.14  In order to 
meet these objectives, the competing parties aim to sustain the loyalty of traditional core 
supporters, and to win over groups of floating voters.  Thus, polls are used to identify how policies 
can be packaged and presented to the electorate in order to maximise a party’s share of the vote in 
elections.  Furthermore, parties make use of polls by investigating which are the issues upon which 
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its rivals are most vulnerable electorally, and which it is itself particularly strong.  The party can 
then benefit from this information by campaigning aggressively on these issues, steering the focus 
of media and public attention towards them, and consequently shaping the political agenda in ways 
which undermine the credibility of its rivals, and elevate its own standing amongst the electorate. 
Because polls perform such a useful and effective role in these respects, parties tend to nurture 
enduring relationships with the pollsters, and structure polling projects into the heart of their 
campaigning machinery and strategies.  In this way, polls may be said to both facilitate and 
manipulate the democratic process in liberal-capitalist societies.   
 
Polls in East European Societies: 1945 to 1989 
Observing the changing status and activities of opinion polls in East European societies provides 
an interesting insight into the way that they both impact upon, and are themselves influenced, by 
the political process.   
 
Opinion Polls and Communism 
The context for political opinion polling in East European societies could not be more different 
from liberal-capitalist societies in the period between 1945 and 1989.  In communist societies, 
there was a marked division between the state and society, with virtually no meaningful public 
input into the political process.  Governments were ideologically-driven, with an avowed mission 
to transform society, ostensibly on behalf of the entire citizenry.  In such contexts, there was little 
scope for opinion polling.  Opinion polls were perceived by governing elites as having little or no 
practical, philosophical or ideological relevance.  Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, former Central 
Committee member of the Polish Communist Party and chief political (and polling) advisor to 
General Jaruzelski in the 1980s comments that: ‘[t]he picture of a differentiated society that 
emerged from the public opinion research did not fit the thesis on the moral and political unity of 
the nation obligatory at that time’ (Kwiatkowski, S. 1989, p.4).15 
 
Communist governments throughout Central and East Europe took a rather dim view of social 
science generally, and of social research methods and opinion polling in particular.  As a leading 
Polish opinion pollster during the communist reign in Poland during the 1980s, Piotr 
Kwiatkowski16 notes: 
During the Stalinist period, every attempt to express independent opinion on social 
or political issues was brutally suppressed.  The notion of public opinion was 
officially condemned and sociology was banned from the universities of all 
communist countries as a Western ‘pseudo-science’. 
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Essentially, internal public politics did not exist.  Politics was generally only public at the 
international level, with governments either extending friendship to other communist political 
systems, or engaged in an ideological offensive against global capitalism.  Internally, societies 
were highly politicised in terms of party membership and public propaganda, but there was a 
notable absence of ‘politics’ in the sense of publicly competing interests and adversarial opinions.  
One-party states were the norm, with political priorities limited to one goal (the emancipation of 
humankind) while class, and hence class struggle, was not officially acknowledged to exist.  There 
was no effective choice between parties.  There were no conflicting ideologies concerning how 
society and the economy should be run.  There were therefore presumed to be no differences 
amongst citizens in terms of their political values and orientations.17  As Webb18 explains: 
One overriding factor, the predominance of the communist party and its particular 
philosophy, means that much of the subject matter which was the source of the 
growth of opinion polling in Western countries… reporting divided opinions in the 
community on political issues, do not happen. 
 
Where polling did take place, it was usually carefully controlled by the political elites, and met 
with significant scepticism by the public.19  Indeed, political leaders were often highly critical of 
opinion polls.  For instance, the reform period of the Polish October of 1956 was noticeable by 
the relative openness in the approach of the Gomulka’s Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) to 
opinion polling.  Shortly after however, the government re-imposed censorship and restrictions on 
the press and the academic community, and in particular, on sociology: 
Polish empirical sociologists were publicly denounced as infected with ‘polling-
mania’, and as neglecting a Marxist theory of social consciousness.  Questionnaires 
were censored and very few, if any, copies of results were published.20 
 
Furthermore, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP in 1963, set up to discuss 
ideological issues in Polish society, a special session was devoted to sociology.  Sociologists were 
criticised for their emphasis on Western methodological approaches, for their apparent 
concentration on recent Western theoretical achievements, and for their lack of enthusiasm for 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist accounts of historical development and society.  As a result, the 
directors of the state-owned polling agency, Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej (OBOP) were 
removed from their posts, and the activities of the institute were reorganised and scaled down.21   
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, polling continued to operate at OBOP, but this was carefully 
controlled by the Communist authorities, and had a restricted scope of coverage.  Political issues 
were considered by the party leadership to be generally out of bounds for the pollsters, except 
where these presented a positive image of the party and its programmes, or where they could be 
manipulated and published for propaganda purposes.22  According to Szymondarski,23 a former 
director of OBOP, polls were used by the regime as an instrument for the legitimisation of 
communist rule: 
The polls used by the political elite were restricted in the issues that they surveyed.  
The elite pretended to be open, but all opposition was banned, ideas of self-
government were banned.  There were no proper democratic political institutions.  
The elite only spent money on the polls if the results were favourable to the regime.  
In this way, the polls helped to prop up the regime, and assist political stability.  
The main role of the polls was to make up for the democratic institutions which 
were lacking in Poland, but only in one dimension - the propaganda dimension. 
 
Polls in East European Societies: The Postcommunist Experience  
Since the collapse of communism, political opinion polls have achieved a high-profile status in 
political affairs throughout Eastern Europe.  In previous research, it was revealed that policy-
makers, politicians and political parties made much use of polls in the early years of democratic 
transition, although for various reasons they were received with significant scepticism by each of 
these users and by citizens alike.24   In the remaining sections of this article there is a focus 
exclusively on opinion polling in Bulgaria which is designed to address broader issues concerning 
the role and impact of polls on the political process in postcommunist countries.  This discussion 
is intended firstly, to indicate the extent to which opinion polls continue to perform an important 
role in party electioneering in Bulgaria.  The second objective is to reveal the underlying rationale 
that Bulgarian political parties and political elites have in using opinion polls.  Are parties 
genuinely interested in devolving political power directly to citizens, by providing voters with a 
means through which their views and interests can be heard (and acted upon) by political elites?  
Or, are polls used for purely instrumental reasons, as part of a party’s marketing strategy to increase 
its political power and influence? 
 
Polls and Political Parties in Postcommunist Bulgaria 
Earlier research25 has revealed that, like their counterparts in Western Europe and the USA, 
political parties in Eastern Europe frequently use publicly-reported polls in their electioneering.  
Such polls are used to monitor electoral opinion, to build electoral strategies, to identify the issue 
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priorities of the electorate and of targeted groups, to modify and shape the image of parties, and to 
guide focused campaigning (in terms of selecting key geographic areas and electoral groupings).  
 
In Bulgaria, only a minority of political parties have access to sufficient resources to be able to 
commission their own polling projects.  This is largely because of the nature of the party system 
which impedes the development of strong and sustained party-pollster links of the kind that are 
noticeable in countries like Britain.  The proliferation of parties26 results in a situation where 
demand for the polls as a source of political intelligence to help market the parties cannot be 
satisfied.27  Nonetheless, the political parties are typically very attentive to the messages emerging 
from opinion polls.  Elena Poptodorova, Political Council member of the Bulgarian Euroleft 
Coalition (KE),28 claims that across Bulgaria, political parties observe polling results with a critical 
interest; this enables them to monitor their own electoral popularity, as well as the state of public 
support for their political opponents: 
I think we all are very, as I say, keen to what opinion polls say and we are also 
respectful to what sociologists have to say . . . The most widespread [type of poll 
monitored] is popularity or personal image of political leaders.  This is something 
very frequent, very regular I would say.   
 
But polls are often used in a more structured and direct way by the parties than for merely assessing 
the public’s reaction to their performance.  As is the case in countries like Britain, parties in 
Bulgaria occasionally employ polling information to articulate the concerns of voters, and then use 
this intelligence to guide policy-formation.  For instance, the United Democratic Forces (UDF)29 
commissioned a series of opinion polls in the run-up to the 1997 General Election.  The intention 
was to build an understanding of the public’s perception of the incumbent BSP (Bulgarian Socialist 
Party) government, including voters’ general level of satisfaction with its performance in office, 
and of its individual policies.  Furthermore, the polls provided an important source of information 
in both determining how the UDF should distinguish itself as a real alternative to the BSP 
government in its pre-election campaign programme, as well as developing its own Agenda 2001, 
the cornerstone of its post-election reform programme.30 
 
Polls also have the potential to undermine policy proposals.  For instance, Anastasia Mozer, co-
leader of the Peoples’ Union coalition (NS) and leader of the Agrarian Party, notes how the 
messages received via the polls convinced politicians to abandon a proposal on land reform 
following the election of an UDF-led government in 1997.  This would have involved amending 
the constitution to allow for foreign purchase of, and investment in, Bulgarian land.  The polls 
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indicated that the plans were hugely unpopular with the public, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
mounted a successful campaign in opposition to the proposals:  ‘Public opinion somehow 
influenced that. The government thought it wouldn’t serve the purpose to agitate people in this 
way’.31 
 
We have seen then, that political actors in Bulgaria often use polls to help decide the focus and 
structure of policy-positioning.  This approach to opinion polling reflects an underlying 
assumption held by many involved in Bulgarian political affairs that there is a need to reach beyond 
traditional party structures, and to establish direct communication with voters.  Polls are often 
considered to be a useful mechanism for achieving this goal: 
It is impossible to make politics without opinion polls. It is impossible. It is not 
professional. You have no grounds.  You go to party meetings, you meet the people 
who are of course devoted to the idea - they are very active and so on. But this is 
not the majority of the people. You have to know about people, how they really 
think.32 
 
This suggests that political parties use polls primarily to compete more effectively within the 
political arena, rather than to establish a more participatory form of political system.  In order to 
achieve this competitiveness, parties recognise that they need to adopt a flexible approach to the 
electorate, and opinion polls provide a useful means for achieving this. 
 
One of the major political parties recently developed an innovative opinion polling programme to 
establish on-going links with voters in preparation for the 1999 local elections.  The Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP) set up a nationally co-ordinated project involving intensive, localised polling 
research.  Local party members and supporters were trained by professional polling agencies in 
basic opinion polling methodology, and then designed and managed the research themselves.  It 
was intended that the results from these localised studies would complement the national 
campaigning programme by revealing which issues were of importance to local communities, and 
how they should be approached and presented.33 
 
Another aspect of polling research sometimes undertaken by the political parties, involves using 
the results to identify the key concerns of the public with the intention of setting the election 
agenda.  This type of research is quite uncommon, as most parties are unable to afford to 
commission their own polling research.  However, the following example provides a useful insight 
into the level of importance attached to polling by political parties, as well as the importance for 
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parties of building close relations with pollsters.  The Bulgarian Euroleft Coalition  (KE), a 
relatively new political party,34 was able to call upon the services of one of the larger and more 
established opinion polling agencies, British-Balkan Social Surveys (BBSS), at the 1997 General 
Election.  Two of the company’s leading directors have ideological sympathy with the party, and 
are members of its ruling political council.  Elena Poptodorova, one of the KE’s leading politicians, 
explains how a series of local opinion polls conducted by BBSS assisted her campaigning in the 
run-up to the general election.  Having spent virtually all her life in an urban setting but contesting 
a rural seat, part of her polling strategy entailed gaining a sense of the local electorate’s concerns:  
I wanted a distinction between rural areas and urban areas. Because this [Sofia] is 
my area, but my constituency is a strongly rural area . . . Then I wanted to know 
what are the main issues of concern [of my constituents]. So what should the agenda 
for the election be?35 
 
The experiences of this research are quite revealing in terms of other ways in which polling 
intervenes in the political process.  For instance, the results guided the candidate’s choice of which 
local and regional issues to focus upon in the pre-election campaign, and also how to mould her 
general party-policy commitments around these localised concerns in her constituency within the 
Dobrich region: 
My motto for the election was, ‘What is good for Dobrich is good for the country’…  
I tried to address agriculture in terms of land market restitution of ownership rights, 
and the peaceful co-existence of traditional co-operatives with the new class of 
small landholders.36 
 
Thus, opinion polls were instrumental in terms of deciding the campaign themes, of emphasising 
particular types of policy form, and of presenting the candidate’s agenda.  This conclusion was 
reinforced when the respondent was asked: ‘Is there anything that you learnt from that particular 
polling information that might help you in your campaigning work in the future?’.  The reply 
indicates that the opinion polls provided the candidate with clear guidance about what her 
campaign themes should be – to avoid general ideological rhetoric and national and international 
affairs, but to emphasise instead more pragmatic, immediate, and ‘provincial’ concerns of the local 
electorate: 
Oh yes.  It was that rural areas were less receptive to social democracy, ‘Third Way’ 
policies and platforms.  Second, foreign policy issues remain rather far from the 
grassroots.  That area [Dobrich], as I say, has been very close to the earth, and less 
interested in issues like NATO, the European Union, and things like that.37 
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The degree of importance attached to the emerging polling data by the candidate was then revealed 
in a subsequent line of questioning:  
Question: So, does this opinion poll information suggest to you that, when 
campaigning, you should be less concerned with national issues, and more 
concerned with local issues? 
 
Poptodorova:  Exactly. I abandoned the area [of foreign affairs in the election 
rhetoric] - although this is my profession, and I love discussing these issues. That’s 
how I got deeper into agriculture, which I’ve never done in all my life. 
 
The respondent was sufficiently sensitive to both the context of recent Bulgarian political history, 
as well as the messages from the polls, to recognise that campaigning at a deeper ideological level 
(around a new ‘Third Way’ programme) would not necessarily be the most effective way of 
attracting voters whose values were structured around a ‘left-right’ divide.  However, focusing on 
more pragmatic, immediate issues was revealed by the polls as likely to reap electoral dividends 
in terms of attracting voters away from the two dominant postcommunist party coalitions in 
Bulgaria: 
Question: You mentioned that many voters in these rural areas were not very 
receptive to the Third Way approach to politics.  Does this mean that when you 
campaign you avoid talking about the Third Way, and talk instead about issues that 
the polls suggest to you are likely to win votes? 
 
Poptodorova:  Exactly.  Because if it is otherwise, again ideology comes forth, and 
what we still have as a predominant attitude is the bi-polar attitude.  In politics it is 
either BSP or UDF – communism, or anti-communism.  Its not termed in that way 
any longer, which is still a progress . . . Language has changed, but instincts are 
more or less the same.  This is my experience, not try to attack their ideological set-
up because it takes time. It will take a generation. 
 
Previous research38 indicates that in the early period after the fall of communist-led regimes in 
Eastern Europe, polls had frequently been used by new political parties in their general 
campaigning strategies, and in a variety of ways.  These included guiding party tactics in relation 
to whether to form or leave coalitions with other parties, and also which electoral groups to target 
in their campaigning.   For the relatively new KE coalition, polls performed similar functions.  
  11 
Firstly, in terms of how they would be perceived by voters who were typically predisposed to 
either the BSP or the UDF:  
We used to belong to the BSP and we split in 1996. So to me it was curious to know how 
would we be viewed [in polls] having left the previous majority and having formed a new 
party.39 
 
The KE also asked questions in the polls specifically about which group of voters might potentially 
become a ‘natural’ electoral constituency for the Party.  The data which emerged formed an 
important element of the process through which the Party identified key target groups for focused 
campaigning – disaffected left-wing traditionalists, as well as the relatively young, the highly 
educated, and those voters living in urban areas: 
The pendulum is still running in extremes. For example, what we found out in the 
last elections was that some twenty percent of the voters who have never touched 
the blue ticket,40 voted blue this time in 1997, simply as a protest vote against the 
BSP. But these are people, as I say who in their natural attitude wouldn’t vote for a 
right wing or extreme right wing party. They just didn’t want what they had in the 
last two years [the BSP government]. This is one segment.  Plus people who 
abstained.  I must tell you that hesitating voters who have not made their decision 
until almost [the] last week of the elections would be less than about 20% in this 
country. It’s always like that.  This is another thing which polls tell us… Usually 
these [people] are the best-educated people.  Urban population mostly.  Not too 
young and not too old. This is the age group of between twenty and fifty.41  
 
Polls may also serve a useful function for political parties in terms of candidate-selection, by 
indicating which personality would most likely maximise the party’s share of support in an 
election.  For instance, Nora Ananieva,42 former Parliamentary Leader of the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party and Deputy Leader of the Bulgarian National Assembly, claims that the party’s preference 
for Georgi Pirinski as its 1996 Presidential candidate was in part informed by internally-
commissioned opinion polls.  These polls suggested that no other BSP candidate could win the 
election.43 
 
In this discussion, we have seen that opinion polls perform various useful functions for Bulgarian 
political parties in shaping their electioneering strategies.  They help the parties to decide upon 
their policy agendas, which policies should be emphasised publicly during an election campaign, 
how policy positions should be presented, how to identify potential electoral allies, and candidate 
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selection.  This has been revealed in previous research across East Europe in the early years of 
democratic transition,44 as well as in the more recent period in Bulgarian political life reported 
above.   
 
Polls and Manipulation of the Political Process in Postcommunist Bulgaria 
However, the emphasis on opinion polling data has not always been advantageous for individual 
political parties.  For instance, in 1991, polls indicated that some of the major partners within the 
Union of the Democratic Forces (the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Agrarians) would 
stand to maximise their vote if they left the coalition.  The polls forecast between 12 and 13 percent 
electoral support for these parties if they were to campaign outside of the UDF – a more than 
sufficient level of voter support to pass the four percent electoral threshold necessary to win seats 
in the National Assembly.  In the event, these parties left the UDF, but subsequently failed to 
achieve this minimum four percent target.  This had a dramatic effect on the perception of opinion 
polls held by both the public and by the political parties: 
The split was actually suicide for these [parties]. The main accusation was that the 
polls provoked those parties to think that they would actually profit from the split 
off. Which actually did not happen.  If UDF had not split at that time they would 
have had a larger margin over the Socialist Party45.  The difference was between 
one and two percent - very, very close.46 
 
Thus, while opinion polls may provide obvious benefits to the political parties in their general 
campaigning strategies and their political marketing, their usage for these purposes is often a source 
of significant controversy.  Two of the enduring features of opinion polls in Bulgaria in both 
communist and postcommunist times, is that they are widely perceived by political elites, parties and 
citizens alike as manipulative, and that they are treated with scepticism.  As Dimiter Stefanov, Vice 
Chair of the Democratic Party, claims: 
From the beginning [of the democratic transition, 1989] there was widespread 
scepticism on the work of the political machinery.  There was also that scepticism 
was extended to opinion polls, and early opinion polls, the early agencies were 
suspected of deliberate misrepresentation.  And later the results proved those 
suspicions were fairly correct.  So that didn’t bring about much confidence and 
esteem in the methods of registering and measuring public opinion . . . Up until 
now a large number of people, including myself, have been inclined to doubt the 
validity of the method that gauges popularity of politicians.47 
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It is not only politicians who are sceptics of polls.  Many journalists and press editors have reservations 
about the relationships which often exist between the political parties, newspapers, and the different 
polling agencies, and of the subsequent manipulation of polls which is alleged to occur: 
Every newspaper has its own opinion poll agents . . . So we can use only ours.  We 
can read other newspapers’ [polls]. The sociological institutes [pollsters] they go to 
one or other party. They work for them in every election, especially the first one.  
One of them says that the Communists will win.  Another said Democrats will. 
Everyone said their politicians and their party will win.  After that people, including 
journalists, don’t believe [the polls] very much.  Everybody knows that these 
agencies work for these parties and they maybe then say they aren’t true.48 
 
The remainder of this article focuses on this issue of the manipulation of opinion polls in Bulgarian 
political life.  It is an issue that was raised voluntarily without any prompting in virtually all the 
interviews conducted for this study. 
 
In earlier research conducted across East Europe, it was found that polls were widely criticised on a 
number of counts.49  Firstly, it is usually only the larger parties who have the resources to commission 
them.  Consequently, smaller parties often attempt to discredit political opinion polls on the grounds 
that they both facilitate unfair electoral competition, and help contribute to the continued dominance 
of the larger parties.  In countries like Bulgaria where the electoral system sets a minimum percentage 
threshold of voter support before a party can gain representation in parliament, this is a particularly 
contentious area for polling.  The concern is that polls can help create a bandwagon for a party if the 
results indicate that it will likely score above this threshold (4% in Bulgaria), suggesting to voters that 
their support for the party would not result in a ‘wasted vote’.  Small, resource-poor political parties 
are disadvantaged electorally if they are unable to commission their own polls to generate the kind of 
bandwagons of public support that are possible for the larger, resource-rich parties that can afford 
opinion polls. 
 
There is also widespread scepticism about the use of polls by those parties who have established 
relationships with opinion polling companies.  This concern is based on the premise that such 
relationships tend to amount to collusion, in which the objective is to publish misleading results to 
disorientate rival parties.  In Bulgaria, the historical relationship between the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and British-Balkan Social Surveys (BBSS), has been widely criticised on these 
grounds, although there is no concrete evidence that such a falsification of poll data has taken 
place.50  The third major concern about the role and impact of polls in postcommunist countries is the 
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proliferation of (largely unknown) ad hoc ‘ghost’ pollsters during election campaign periods.  These 
‘ghost’ agencies are usually linked to political parties, and have as their sole purpose the manipulation 
of electoral outcomes and the general political process.  This usually involves artificially elevating 
the standing of a preferred party (with the intention of creating a bandwagon effect), or reporting a 
(fictitious) decline in the share of voter support for a rival party (with the intention of undermining its 
position as an electorally ‘credible’ party).51  
 
The degree of scepticism held by political parties (and even some opinion pollsters) is still significant 
in Bulgaria a decade after the collapse of communism.  Much of this scepticism is reinforced by a 
number of recent high-profile cases where poll data has been used to poor effect by politicians, and 
where the data itself may have been misleading.  The net effect has been that party strategists have 
over-emphasised the importance of polls, and have been steered by the poll results into making tactical 
errors during election contests.  In one case, the UDF leadership responded to a series of messages 
(including those reported by the opinion polls) and opted to insist on an early election in December 
1994, rather than accept President Zhelev’s invitation to form a government after the resignation of 
Lieuben Berov’s Administration earlier in September.  Shortly before the election was called, the 
polls had presented a variable picture of the state of public opinion - particularly the likely share of 
support to be gained by the major competing parties and coalition groups.  As one senior member of 
the UDF leadership notes however, those who were in favour of an early election were very selective 
in their use of polling intelligence to justify their case: 
In 1994 the UDF and the then President of the UDF, Mr Filip Dimitrov insisted, 
and probably believed that the UDF were poised to win a landslide in an election.  
Or win an absolute majority.  In actual fact the UDF won only 26 percent, while 
the communists won 43 percent.52  [There was a] [f]ailure to foresee that 
discrepancy between expectation and reality.  All opinions were backed up by 
opinion polls . . . [and] those in the UDF who chose to indulge in wishful thinking 
had enough opinion polls to lean on [to support their preference for an early 
election].53  
 
In another example, the Bulgarian President, Zhelieu Zhelev was persuaded by a close group of 
advisors to stand as a candidate for the UDF nomination to contest the 1996 presidential election.  
Against a backdrop in which media-reported polls indicated variable levels of support for the two 
nominees, the internal poll data presented to Zhelev was relatively conclusive - that he would win the 
contest if he were to declare his candidacy.  Against the advice of some leading colleagues, he opted 
to stand for the UDF nomination, but ultimately lost by a margin of three to one to Petar Stoyanov.54  
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As one senior UDF colleague noted, Zhelev’s decision to contest the nomination of the UDF was 
very much influenced by these internal opinion polls.55  The misleading picture these polls presented 
about his prospects is generally considered by political commentators in Bulgaria to have played a 
major part in his inability to foresee failure in the election: 
President Zhelev was misled by some of his advisors - some of them well known 
sociologists and people whose opinion mattered.  He was misled into participating 
in a Bulgarian version of primary elections.  Opinion polls were showing President 
Zhelev (as incumbent) as having a fairly high rating in the chance to succeed.  
While the challenger [Petar Stoyanov] started very modestly, and although his 
figures rose in the course of the campaign, there was no comparison.  The outcome 
was a disaster for President Zhelev. It was like 60 something as against 30 
something.  So it is reasonable to ask what kind of actual measuring in public 
opinion do polls do?56 
 
In another recent high-profile case, the polls failed to accurately forecast the outcome of the 1995 
mayoral election in Sofia.  Throughout the campaign, they predicted a close contest between the 
BSP candidate, Stefan Sofiyanski, and the main challenger from the UDF.  However, contrary to 
all polling expectations, the outcome was a landslide victory for Sofiyanski with 57.6 percent of 
the vote.57 
 
The inference to be drawn from these recent examples is that political parties and election 
candidates place particular faith in the ability of opinion polls to measure their prospects in election 
contests.  However, the messages communicated via the polls are often variable, contradictory and 
misleading.  Usage of the polls is also often misjudged.  Such data has even been used selectively 
to support strategic and tactical electoral positions, even if the rationale for using them is flawed.  
The outcome in such cases may have negative consequences for the parties concerned, as these 
examples appear to indicate.  The explanation for these discrepancies between poll forecasts and 
election outcomes mirrors those revealed in research conducted in the early 1990s - that there is 
collusion between some of the opinion pollsters, the political parties, and the mass media 
organisations who publish the findings.58  This collusion even includes manipulation of the polling 
data.59  As a consequence, there is widespread public scepticism of polls: 
All of these [opinion polling] companies have connection with political parties. 
That is the big problem. Because they are not objective.  They have influence - 
government influence and opposition influence.  That is the position.  It is 
problematic because people don’t believe the results of these surveys. Because they 
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know that the company has a connection either with the government or with the 
opposition.60 
 
Most observers consider that this issue is less salient in Bulgarian political life now, than it was in 
the period immediately following the democratic transition, post-1989.  However, the problem still 
significantly mars the reputation, and consequently the development of opinion polling.61  Where 
manipulation of the polls does take place, it appears to serve two functions, both of which are 
designed to enable a party to gain an advantage over their competitors: to increase their share of 
voter support at elections, and subsequently their degree of political power.  Neither of these 
functions can be conclusively determined but, through the interviews conducted for this research, 
both are widely acknowledged to exist.  Firstly, the manipulation of polls has the objective to 
disorientate rival parties.  Secondly, publishing misleading accounts of the polls is designed to 
create a bandwagon of voter support for the party involved.  As one interviewee62 for this research 
noted: 
One thing I am sure of is that opinion polls, manipulated opinion polls, are 
considered a useful instrument for shaping the attitudes of the swing vote which is 
quite large in this country - thirty or forty percent at the latest moment. So [opinion 
polls] play on the instinct of the swing voters to vote with the expected majority, 
[and] jump on the bandwagon.  Psychologically and sociologically this may be true 
for the orientation of the swing voters in this country, and maybe throughout the 
East. I’m not a sociologist myself.  But that’s what I have heard from specialists.  
If that is the case that can explain the variety of opinion polls and the disturbing 
discrepancy between them and some of the [election] results.   
 
Conclusion 
What does the experience of polling in postcommunist Bulgaria, and in particular the way that 
polls are used by the political parties, reveal about: (a) their impact upon the general political 
process; and (b) whether George Gallup’s ambition for polls - that they should be used to extend 
democratic practice, create linkages between citizens and political elites, and generally empower 
voters – is a useful way of understanding the role of opinion polls in postcommunist Bulgaria?  
The findings reported in this article suggest that political parties continue to demonstrate a keen 
degree of interest in polls.  As with the findings from earlier investigations in other postcommunist 
countries,63 the value attached to polls by the parties, and the usage to which they are put, broadly 
reflect what has been observed in West European countries.  The interest that political parties have 
in opinion polls reflects more a desire on their part for developing strategies to compete effectively 
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with their rivals, than for engaging in a reflective dialogue with citizens to build a more 
‘participative’ style of democracy.  In some cases, polling research is reported to the public in 
order to mislead rather than enlighten voters, with the express purpose of creating a bandwagon 
effect for the party, and maximising its share of voter support in election contests.  Such a cynical 
approach to the use of opinion polls is widely perceived to exist, and as a consequence, the public, 
the media and the political parties continue to poll-watch with a sceptical eye.   
 
A decade after the collapse of communism and the movement toward democratic consolidation in 
Eastern Europe, political elites use opinion polls not to extend political power to citizens, but to 
concentrate it in their own hands. This suggests that an understanding of how polls impact on the 
political process in postcommunist countries is better explained in terms of Schumpeter’s view of 
competitive elitism, than Gallup’s direct democracy model. 
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